INTRODUCTION
Throughout American history, children and adolescents have been sentenced to death for their crimes. ' The imposition of death sentences on these young offenders, far from being a practice of the past, is a reality of the present. Eighteen of the 1,137 inmates currently on the nation's death rows 2 committed their crimes when they were under eighteen years old. 3 It is expected that many more youths will receive death sentences in the years ahead. 4 Until recently, little has been said in the capital punishment debate about the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on minors. 5 The issue, however, increasingly is I See infra notes 22, 34 and accompanying text.
I The Treatment of Minors at Common Law
The United States, during the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century, applied the English common law rules concerning the criminal liability of children and older adolescents. 16 Under these rules, there was an irrebuttable presumption that children below the age of seven were incapable of forming criminal intent.' 7 Thus, these minors were never liable for their felonious acts. 18 Children between seven and fourteen also were presumed to be incapable of entertaining criminal intent.' 9 But in their case, the presumption could be rebutted by a showing that the child was able to distinguish between right and wrong and had understood the nature of his or her act and that it was wrong. 20 Children fourteen years or older were deemed fully capable of forming criminal intent and therefore always were liable for their criminal offenses. 2 1 Consequently, during this early period of American history, children and adolescents could be, and were, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. 
The Development of the Juvenile Justice System
In the 1820's, a fundamental change in the treatment of young offenders began to develop in the United States, and the seeds of the juve- These efforts to create separate juvenile facilities developed, during the late 1890's and early 1900's, into a juvenile court movement. Recognizing that the establishment of juvenile correctional institutions alone was not sufficient to meet the special needs of children and adolescents, reformers sought to establish courts exclusively for young offenders. These courts were to abandon the rigid procedures and adversarial processes of the criminal courts and to adopt practices sensitive to the needs of children and dispositions suited to the goals of rehabilitation. 30 The first such court was established in 1899 when Illinois passed its Juvenile Court Act. 31 By 1925, every state except Maine and Wyoming had followed Illinois' lead, enacting some type of juvenile court statute. 32 Though the precise formulas varied, all of the juvenile court systems shared three characteristics: a lack of formal adversary proceedings; an extensive prehearing investigation of an offender's background; and an attempt to prescribe for each offender a rehabilitation program most fit for his or her needs. 33 Although societal attitudes toward young offenders changed dramatically during this period of American history, children and adolescents continued to receive the death penalty. Between 1864 and 1939, at least twenty-eight people under age eighteen were executed.
34 Of course, these minors were not sentenced to death by the juvenile courts, which lacked the power to impose such punishment. Rather, these minors had been transferred from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts to that of the adult criminal courts.
35 chief aim to fill a father's place to these unfortunate youth. . . . The law of kindness has been our rule in regulating its discipline.
Fox, supra note 23, at 1208 (quoting FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICERS OF THE CHI-CAGO REFORM SCHOOL TO THE BOARD OF GUARDIANS 14-15 (1856)). Although the school's "familial" system followed the goals of the reform movement, the school's efforts were shortlived. Judges developed a practice of sentencing only the most incorrigible youth to the school. 
B. THE PRESENT SITUATION
.
The Juvenile Justice System and the Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal Court
Today all states have juvenile court acts. 36 These courts have jurisdiction over three types of juveniles: (1) those who commit crimes; (2) those who engage in status offenses; 37 and (3) those who "find themselves in a dependent state of being. '38 In most states, juvenile courts retain jurisdiction over these youths until they reach age eighteen. 39 However, as in the early history of the juvenile court system, some minors who commit crimes can be, and often are, tried in adult courts, 40 where they may receive criminal penalties, including death. 41 In 1978, for example, 261,234 minors were tried in criminal courts on felony charges. 42 Virtually every state has some process by which minors can be transferred from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts to that of the criminal courts.
4 3 The two principal transfer methods used by the states are judicial waiver and legislative waiver. 39 Thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government designate 18 as the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction. BETWEEN Under judicial waiver, the method employed by most states, 45 the juvenile courts are empowered to divest themselves ofjurisdiction in certain cases and to certify the minor to stand trial in criminal court. 46 The crime and age requirements for judicial waiver vary among the states. 4 7 There is greater uniformity, however, in the substantive criteria used in making waiver decisions. Most jurisdictions follow the criteria suggested by the Supreme Court, 48 and require that juvenile courts waive their jurisdiction only when the minor is not a suitable candidate for treatment or when a disposition within the juvenile system would prove a threat to public safety.
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In determining whether a minor is a suitable candidate for treatment, the courts typically consider the minor's age, the nature of the minor's antisocial conduct, the treatment prognosis, and the available COURT 249-64 (1974) ; Browne, supra note 43; Note,Juvenile Crime: The Misguided Target of the Current Solution, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 97 (1979) . A third method, which is used by only a few states, is prosecutorial waiver. Under this method, the juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over minors. The prosecutor chooses the forum in which the juvenile is tried. See BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 61; S. DAVis, supra note 36, at 2-9 to 2-14. 45 Forty-six states, the District of Columbia and the federal government use judicial waiver to make some or all of their transfer decisions. In 28 states and federal jurisdictions, judicial waiver is the only mechanism for criminal prosecution. Feld, supra note 43, at 501 & n. 12. See generally Schornhorst, supra note 39, at 597.
46 Typically, the process is initiated by the state prosecutor, who requests that the juvenile be transferred to criminal court. A hearing is then conducted by the juvenile court to determine whether the minor should be transferred. See BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 46. In 1978, 9,352 youths were transferred to criminal court by means of judicial waiver. Of these, over 70% were 17, over 92% were male, and only 29% were charged with crimes against the person. Conrad, supra note 42, at 552. 47 For example, in some jurisdictions, judicial waiver is permitted only if the minor is accused of a felony. E.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL treatment resources. 50 The decision focuses on whether the minor can be rehabilitated by the procedures, services and facilities currently available to the juvenile courts. 5 1 Thus, a determination that a minor is not a suitable candidate for treatment does not necessarily mean that the minor is untreatable or incapable of being rehabilitated completely. Rather, it may mean only that the juvenile justice system does not have the necessary resources. 52 Indeed, two of the most common bases for waiver are inadequate resources and insufficient time to effectuate rehabilitation. 53 Factors considered in determining whether a disposition within the juvenile system would prove a threat to public safety are the minor's dangerousness and age. 54 In assessing the minor's dangerousness, the courts typically consider the seriousness of the crime with which the minor is charged and the minor's past juvenile record. 55 Age plays a role in these waiver decisions because minors can be retained in the juvenile justice system only until they reach the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction, which is usually eighteen. 56 Upon reaching this age, or shortly thereafter, they must be released. Thus, when the juvenile court determines that a minor is "dangerous,"
' 57 it must consider the period of time it has left in which to treat the youth. If the time is too short for proper rehabilitation or the resources too inadequate to treat the minor within the period of time available, the "dangerous" juvenile is trans- ferred to criminal court, where he can receive a sentence that would keep him in custody beyond his eighteenth birthday.
The principal alternative to judicial waiver is legislative waiver.
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Under this method, statutes provide that minors charged with certain specified crimes come automatically within the jurisdiction of the criminal courts. 59 The designated crimes are often capital and other serious offenses. 60 As in the case of judicial waiver, the minimum age at which a youth can be transferred varies among the states. 6 62 The most common criticism ofjudicial waiver is that the standards of "dangerousness" and "amenability to treatment" used are "in effect broad, standardless grants of discretion." Feld, supra note 43, at 507; see, e.g., Schornhorst, supra note 39; Note, supra note 53; Comment, supra note 50. 63 The major criticism of legislative waiver is that it contradicts the entire philosophy of the juvenile justice system, as it allows minors to be transferred solely on the basis of the offense charged, and thus many juveniles who could benefit greatly from the treatment available in the juvenile system and who may pose no future threat to society are subjected to the criminal process. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 43, at 508-09; Comment, Waiver in Indiana: A Conflict with the Coa/s of the Juvenile Justice System, 53 IND. L.J. 601 (1978) . 64 The substantive criteria of judicial waiver never have been challenged in the Supreme Court. The lower appellate courts that have examined the standards have been unresponsive to the various constitutional attacks, such as "void for vagueness," that have been made. See Even critics of these particular methods of transfer do not deny that minors, in certain circumstances, should be moved to the criminal system. 65 In fact, transfer is viewed as a functional necessity, required for three important purposes: (1) to protect the public from those juveniles whom the juvenile system is incapable of rehabilitating; (2) to deter juveniles from committing serious crimes; 66 and (3) to ease the burden on the juvenile justice system. 6 7 Thus, though there may be criticism of the particular methods by which transfer decisions are made, transfer itself generally is accepted and is certain to remain a part of the juvenile justice process.
Minors in Crninal Court
Once transferred to criminal court, a minor typically is eligible for all criminal penalties, including death. aiver, therefore, remains an unsatisfactory, but nevertheless practical, means of ridding the juvenile court of persons whom it is not equipped to handle, and more likely than not, has mishandled in the first place"); Comment, supra note 58, at 179 ("the transfer process clearly is needed to alleviate some of the problems of the overburdened juvenile justice system"); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535 (1975) ("there appears to be widely shared agreement that not all juveniles can benefit from the special features and programs of the juvenile-court system and that a procedure for transfer to an adult court should be available"). That most critics of legislative and judicial waiver object to these particular methods rather than to transfer itself is evidenced further by their tendency to propose new transfer methods or to suggest ways to improve the present ones. (1976) . Since these decisions, all death penalty states have adopted some form of aggravating-mitigating capital punishment system. Under this system, a capital sentencer must find at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute before it can impose the death penalty. Aggravating circumstances vary among the jurisdictions, but they usually include factors such as that the capital crime was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel," committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another felony, or committed for pecuniary gain. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 161; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 248 n.6. Under this format, the defendant is permitted to proffer mitigating circumstances, which might justify a sentence less than death. These circumstances include the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime, the defendant's cooperation with the police, the defendant's lack of a prior criminal record, and the fact that the defendant's action occurred under duress or the domination of another. adopt legislative waiver for serious offenses. 77 Moreover, the total abolition of juvenile court jurisdiction over minors accused of criminal offenses may be forthcoming 78 because of growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the juvenile system to rehabilitate young offenders 79 and with the lack of certain constitutional safeguards in the system. 80 The 77 E.g., 29 A Judiciary-Courts Acts, § 301.2(8) (West 1983) (in addition to 16-and 17-yearolds who were already subject to adult proceedings, the New York Act specifically targeted 13-, 14-and 15-year-olds who commit violent criminal acts for adjudication in the adult system). See generalv BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 81-82. The New York Act provides a clear example of how the "get tough" attitude toward juvenile crime led a state to turn to legislative waiver. New York's tougher stand on juvenile crime resulted in part from its desire that these youths receive "longer sentences, be exposed to adult prisons and face public trials instead of private proceedings" and from its dissatisfaction with the lenient and meaningless dispositions previously imposed on juveniles. Levy While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purposes to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults. [Vol. 74 The Act provides for a dual method of treatment for young offenders: legal control (i.e., juvenile court) for youths who engage in serious crimes, and informal social control (i.e., family, school, church, and community services) for youths who engage in less serious crimes and non-criminal behavior. See generally THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra note 38, at 2. Under this new method, the juvenile courts should have more time and resources available to handle serious offenders. Moreover, the J.J.D.P. Act of 1974 authorizes both prevention and control of delinquency. 42 U.S.C. § 5602(b) (1976) . It created the National Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and mandated that the office take steps to improve the juvenile justice system and to develop programs to prevent juvenile delinquency. Id. at § 5611. The 1980 amendments to the Act authorized the Office to develop programs focusing on serious and violent offenders. Id. at § 5601(8) (Supp. V 1981). Particular attention is to be paid to prevention and rehabilitation. A few states and several commentators have followed the federal government's lead and begun to pay increasing attention to the rehabilitation of serious and violent offenders. See, e.g., Calhoun & Wayne, Can the MassachusetlsJuvenile System Survive the Eighties? 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 522 (1981) (discusses Massachusetts' program of community-based correction for serious juvenile offenders); able to save its3 and the government's programs may be short-lived because of recent budget cuts.
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That more minors will be sentenced to death also is indicated by the growing willingness, at least on the part of some, to impose this sentence on minors. More and more states are amending their death penalty statutes to permit the imposition of death sentences on offenders under age eighteen. 85 That eighteen juvenile offenders are currently on death row certainly demonstrates that sentencers are willing to impose the penalty. 86 All of these factors, along with the increasingly common imposition of death sentences in general, 8 7 strongly suggest that more minors will receive capital sentences in the years ahead, unless there is judicial recognition that the death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed on these very young offenders.
Coates, Deinstitutionalization and the Srious Juvenie Offender: Some Poliy Considerations, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 477 (1981) .
The 1980 amendments to the JJ.D.P. Act also authorized the removal of juveniles from adult jails and lock-ups. 42 U.S.C. § 5602(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981). The statute provides for federal grants to be given to sites participating in the program. Currently, 51 states and territories participate. During 1981, the number of juveniles in regular contact with adults fell from 58,058 to 39,041. REPORT OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT AGENCIES, supra note 75, at 23. 83 For example, even if the courts were to impose all the procedural guarantees of the Constitution on the juvenile courts, the problem of inadequate treatment resources and facilities would remain. One also could challenge capital punishment for minors by arguing that juveniles have a constitutional right to treatment. As noted earlier, such a right is based on the theory that because the juvenile justice system institutionalizes minors for the purpose of rehabilitation, juveniles have a right to treatment. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. If such a right were held to exist, imposition of the death penalty would be unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court has not yet recognized such a right. And it is unlikely to do so, at least in regard to those juveniles who have committed serious felonies, as such juveniles are institutionalized not merely for the purpose of rehabilitation, but also for the purpose of penal custody. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. It is probably for this very reason that no one has yet challenged capital punishment for juveniles on the ground that these minors, who have committed capital crimes, have a constitutional right to treatment. Oklahoma suggests that at least four of the Justices are prepared to reject an eighth amendment argument. 455 U.S. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Eddings on the question of whether capital punishment for minors violates the eighth amendment. 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). The Court did not decide the issue, however, as it was able to reverse the juvenile defendant's death sentence on other grounds. 455 U.S. at 112-17. See tupra note 8 and accompanying text. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger, who was joined by Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist, objected to the grounds on which the majority reversed Eddings' sentence. 455 U.S. at 120-28. Although he did not elaborate on the certiorari issue regarding the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on minors, at the conclusion of his dissent Chief Justice Burger stated that if it were up to him he would "decide the sole issue on which we granted certiorari and affm the judgment." Id There is, however, one principle that will not be discussed in detail in this Comment that is relevant to the issue at hand; namely, that a punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society, or, as is sometimes said, that it must not offend society's "standards of decency." See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179. In determining whether a punishment is acceptable to contemporary society, the Court is to look at "objective" indicia such as the history of the particular punishment, current legislation, and jury verdicts. Id. at 176-82. Based on such objective indicia, the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty, in general, is not unacceptable to contemporary society. Id. However, society may take quite a different view toward capital punishment when it is applied to children and adolescents. Gallup survey found that while 45% of respondents supported capital punishment for murder, only 23% favored it for persons under 21). Indeed, this is the position commonly taken by those who maintain that capital punishment for minors is "cruel and unusual" punishment. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 18-59; Gwin, supra note 5.
It is doubtful, however, that the "standards of decency" test actually adds very much to an analysis of the constitutionality of imposing death sentences on minors. First, the objective indicia do not demonstrate conclusively whether capital punishment for adolescents is acceptable to Americans. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. Second, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court any longer considers the "standards of decency" test an independent eighth amendment principle, as it did when the test was formally articulated in Gregg. In the Court's most recent decisions, contemporary attitude toward a particular punishment has been relegated to the role of merely a factor to be considered in determining whether a penalty is proportionate under the eighth amendment's excessiveness standard. . 1980) . Moreover, the information about persons sentenced to death does not distinguish between those sentenced by juries and those sentenced byjudges. If one were to rely on this information, however, one would probably conclude that sentencers, in general, are far more reluctant to impose the death penalty on offenders under 20 than they are on those over 20. See id. (of the 567 offenders under sentence of death as of December 31, 1979, 11 were in the under 20 category; 145 were in the 20-to 24-year-old category and 151 were in the age category from 25 to 29 years). This conclusion also is supported by the fact that only 18 of the 1,137 inmates currently on death row are juvenile offenders. See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text. Yet, these low numbers could be attributable to the fact that a significantly smaller percentage of minors than adults commit capital crimes. The Court, in exercising its own judgment, has looked to the culpability of the offender to determine whether the punishment is deserved and therefore proportionate. 1 10 An actor's culpability is a factor of both the severity of the harm caused and the actor's degree of responsibility for the harm.
1 I As the death penalty is the harshest punishment American society imposes, it will be deserved, and thus proportionate, only when the offenders are among the most culpable actors; that is, when their acts have caused the most harm and the offenders are among the most responsible for the harm. Until recently, however, the Supreme Court has focused primarily on the harm caused in determining the proportionality of the punishment to the crime.
1 2 Its analysis has been based on a comparison of the consequences of the punishment for the offender with the consequences of the crime for the victim. In Coker v. Georgia, ' 13 for example, the Court held that the death penalty always is disproportionate to the crime of rape because, though rapists violate the "personal integrity and autonomy" of their victims, 14 they do not take their victims' lives.1 5 Using such an analysis, the Court also has held that when someone kills another it cannot be said that death isper se a disproportionate penalty.1 6 Under such a test, which only looks to the harm done, capital punishment for minors who kill their victims is not a disproportionate penalty: the victims are dead, whether adults or minors commit the offense.
The Court always has recognized the possibility, however, that it would consider the responsibility of the offender for the harm done in its though the evidence indicated that the punishment was unacceptable to contemporary society, the Court stated that this was not determinative: "Although the judgments of legislatures, juries and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the. During the course of a robbery in which Enmund was involved, his accomplices shot and killed two people. Under Florida law, the killing of a human being while engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate the offense of robbery is murder in the first degree, even though there is no premeditated design or intent to kill. The only requirements are that the defendant actually was present, actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the robbery. Although Enmund facilitated the crime, his responsibility for the deaths was not as great as that of his accomplices who intended the deaths and actually pulled the trigger. Felony murderers therefore never could be as deserving of the death penalty as other murderers upon whom death sentences are imposed. Enmund obviously is distinguishable from the case of a minor who intentionally kills another. The thrust of Enmund, however, is a focus on individuals and their responsibility for the harms done, rather than on the crimes for which the offenders were convicted or the consequences to the victims.126 Thus, if it can be established that minors who intentionally kill are always less responsible for the harm than adults who intentionally kill, then minors never will be as culpable as adults, and the state never may impose its maximum penalty, death, on minors: it may not treat minors and adults 12 7 alike. 1 28 And, as will be shown, minors are in all cases less responsible than adults.
The Responsibility of Minors who are in the Juvenile Justice System
While minors are in the juvenile justice system, they are viewed and treated as being less responsible than adults. Most contemporary commentators observe that there is a separate justice system for minors not only so that young offenders can be rehabilitated, but also because minors do not deserve to be punished as severely as adults. 29 These commentators do not posit that minors lack all responsibility for their criminal acts but rather that they are never as responsible for their crimes as adults are for theirs.
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There are several reasons why minors are less responsible, and thus
See id.
127 For the purposes of this Comment, an "adult" is an average person over 18 years of age. The term does not include, for example, the mentally retarded, the mentally ill, or those with diminished capacity.
128 This argument applies with equal force to any penalty that is the maximum the state inflicts for a particular crime. For example, in non-death penalty states, life without parole may be an excessive punishment when imposed on the juvenile murderer.
129 One commentator explains:
The very existence of a dual criminal justice system is evidence of a two-fold societal judgment that: children do not bear the same degree of responsibility for their antisocial behavior as adults and therefore should not be subject to the harsh penalties of criminal trial and penal incarceration; and juvenile delinquents are, by virtue of their youth, responsive to rehabilitative treatment. S. Fox, THE JUVENILE COURT: ITS CONTEXT, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 11-13 (1967); see also PRESIDENT Second, minors are less responsible because they are less able to control their conduct and to recognize the consequences of their acts than are adults. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."' 1 34 That our society also recognizes this fact is evidenced by those laws that prohibit minors from buying alcohol 135 Research also shows that the ability to make moral judgments depends, at least in part, on the broader factor of social experience. Most adolescents simply do not have the breadth and depth of experience essential to making sound value judgments. See M. RUTTER, supra, at 238; Kohlberg, supra, at 404-05. This appears to be particularly true of adolescents who engage in delinquent behavior. A recent study suggests that delinquent minors have a particularly low moral maturity level. The mean moral maturity level of delinquents ages 15 to 17 was found to be that of the average 10-to 12-year-old. Supreme Court's observation. For example, a Presidential committee reporting on youth crime has concluded that adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. 138 The responsibility of minors also is diminished because they are in a developmental stage characterized by defiance of authority and conducive to criminal activity. It has been noted, for example, that
[t]he American adolescent, struggling with the biological and psychological pressures of youth, seeks status and reassurance in the company of his peers. Rebellion against parental authority and restrictions is combined with pressure to conform to the expectations of other adolescents. The teen years are a period of experiment, risk taking and bravado. Some criminal activity is part of the patterns of almost all youth subcultures.
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That the developmental period of adolescence and the turmoil it produces for minors play a part in youth crime further is evidenced by crime statistics, which show a strong correlation between age and criminal activity with the rates of many kinds of criminality peaking in midadolescence. 140 Statistics show that as people pass from the turbulent years of adolescence to the calmer period of the early twenties, they commit fewer offenses, whether or not they were apprehended or partic- 
1494
[Vol. 74 ipated in a rehabilitation program. 14 '
Of course, some minors may be exceptionally mature, 142 fully capable of controlling their conduct and realizing the consequences of their acts, and capable of withstanding the special pressures of adolescence. Yet, there is still a reason why even these minors are less responsible than adults for their crimes. Minors are always less responsible because their crimes are never their fault alone. Society shares responsibility for their crimes, 4 3 and it bears a greater responsibility for the crimes of minors than for those of adults. Legal and sociological studies reveal that juvenile crime often results from the failure of the juvenile's family to provide proper guidance and attention. The main characteristic shared by juveniles who commit serious crimes is membership in a family that provides inadequate supervision and in which there are conflicts, disharmony, and poor parent-child relationships.' 142 It must be admitted that while the Supreme Court has recognized that most minors are less mature than adults, it also has noted that there may be exceptions. In regard to the admissibility of juvenile confessions, for example, the Court has adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether the minor knowingly and intelligently waived his or her fifth amendment right and voluntarily consented to interrogation. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Instead of assuming that all minors are too immature to make such a decision, the Court considers the age, actual maturity, family environment, education, and emotional and mental stability of each minor to determine his or her particular ability to make an informed choice. Moreover, in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court held that states may not blanketly require parental consent in order for a minor to have an abortion. Rather, the states must provide a minor the opportunity to demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature and informed to make an abortion decision without parental guidance.
143 TASK FORCE 1978, supra note 76, at 7 (concluding that minors deserve less punishment than adults: "youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school and social system, which share responsibility for the development of America's youth"); S. WHEELER Sociological theories on the causes of juvenile crime support the conclusion that society must share responsibility for a juvenile's offense. For example, the control theory attributes the cause of delinquency to a failure of the family, school, and community to socialize and control the youth. 148 The basic premise of this theory is that "social behavior requires socialization." G. NETTLER, EXPLAINING CRIME 217 (1974) (emphasis in original). In other words, people become social (moral) to a greater or lesser degree through various socialization processes administered by the family, the schools, and the community. Proper socialization leads to conformity. Improper socialization leads to nonconformity, of which juvenile delinquency is one of the consequences. Under this theory, delinquent behavior occurs because the social process of making the youth moral has been interrupted by uncaring parents, schools, and communities and by delinquent associates. Youngsters who do not develop a bond to the conventional order feel no moral obligation to conform. Thus, they are free to engage in criminal behavior; special delinquent motivation is unnecessary to account for their behavior-they do not know how to act any other way. See generally T. HIRSCHI Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti have focused on what they call the "subculture of violence." They define this subculture as a set of values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns that is shared in high population density urban areas and supports the use of physical aggression and violence as a form of interaction and a way to solve problems. This subculture is generated and sustained in the lower class, where violent behavior is both tolerated and prescribed, from childrearing practices to street murders. The value system of those affected by this subculture calls for quick resort to aggression at relatively weak provocation. (1967) . Moreover, the subculture of violence is "transmitted" from generation to generation-it is learned behavior that is normal within that cultural environment. In fact, it has functional, adaptive survival value for those who live in the communities where the subculture of violence is influential.
Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, who have studied "delinquent subculture," have found that different types of delinquency are generated in different types of communities. The type of delinquency depends on the extent to which the illegitimate opportunity structure has "integrated" age levels of offenders and carriers of conventional and criminal values in the community. Delinquent gangs and subcultures emerge in communities where the illegitimate opportunity structure is organized for involvement in and maintenance of criminal activities. This tradition of crime is passed on to younger generations and new residents. See R. CLOWARD greater opportunity, simply by virtue of time, to outgrow the negative experiences of their youth and to learn appropriate behavior.
152 Minors, on the other hand, are in the midst of experiencing the negative influences of their families or communities; they have not had the chance to change. For this very reason, the Supreme Court has recognized that evidence of a turbulent childhood and of beatings by a harsh father is always "particularly relevant" in determining the appropriate punishment for a minor, whereas such evidence may be unimportant in arriving at the appropriate penalty for an adult. 1 53 Still another reason why society shares a greater responsibility for youth crime is that adolescents are more impressionable than adults.
5 4 Thus, people are more likely to be affected by those negative influences they encounter during their youth than those encountered as adults. That society recognizes this is evidenced by the existence of laws that punish adults who "contribute to the delinquency of minors." 
Transfer and the Responsibility of Minors
As has been shown, minors, in general, are less responsible than adults. The inquiry into juvenile responsibility is far from over, however. Although one of the reasons for having a juvenile justice system is that minors, for the reasons discussed above, are less responsible than are their elders, the fact remains that virtually every state permits the transfer of minors to criminal court. 156 The specific question of whether transfer to criminal court indicates that some minors, at least those transferred, are as responsible as adults therefore must be examined.
The existence of the mechanism of transfer does not indicate, by fact, the juvenile courts often place juveniles on home probation, when their unhealthy home situation is largely responsible for their delinquent behavior in the first place. See Note, supra note 44, at 103. 152 Studies show that delinquent behavior tends to decline when people reach the age of majority and are able to quit school, leave home and strike out on their own. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 115 ("youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence"). itself, that transferred minors are as responsible as their elders. As discussed earlier, one reason for having the juvenile justice system is that minors are less responsible than adults and thus deserve less punishment.1 5 7 But this does not mean that minors deserve no punishment at all. Thus, when minors are found to be dangerous or unsuitable candidates for treatment, there is no reason to keep them in a rehabilitative system that can neither control nor help them. 158 Similarly, it is acceptable to transfer automatically those juveniles who commit certain serious crimes so that they may receive some punishment or so that others might be deterred.' 5 9 It also may be acceptable to transfer juveniles in order to alleviate the massive burden on the juvenile courts.' 60 But none of these reasons commonly given to justify transfer suggest that it has been adopted because some juveniles are as responsible as their elders and deserve to receive the maximum penalties an adult can receive.
Nor do the criteria used in making transfer decisions indicate that transferred minors are as accountable for their crimes as adults are for theirs. Under legislative waiver, minors are transferred solely on the basis of the crime they allegedly committed. 16 1 These crimes are usually very serious offenses, such as murder.1 6 2 But just because a minor commits murder or rape or any other violent offense does not indicate that society is less responsible for the minor's act. Nor is it evidence that the minor is more mature than his peers or is able to control his conduct and understand the consequences of his actions.
Under judicial waiver, minors are transferred because they are not suitable candidates for treatment or because a disposition within the juvenile system would prove a threat to society. 163 The responsibility of society for the juvenile's crime is not considered in making the waiver decision, except perhaps to the extent that factors such as family background might be taken into account in making a treatment prognosis. Indeed, it may be that those who are transferred are the very minors who have suffered most from parental and community neglect and mistreatment. Likewise, an assessment of a juvenile's maturity, if one is made at all, t 64 is only one of the numerous factors considered in deter- 65 The juvenile court need not find that minors are mature in order to transfer them. 66 In fact, maturity rarely, if ever, plays a part in transfer decisions.' 67 Indeed, as noted earlier, the most common bases for waiver are inadequate resources and insufficient time to effectuate rehabilitation.
16 8 Thus, most transfer decisions do not indicate that the minors are mature or even that they cannot be rehabilitated; rather, they reflect the inadequacies of the system. 169 Age plays a role in transfer decisions that are based on a finding that a juvenile court disposition would prove a threat to society.17 0 That a minor is fifteen or sixteen years old, however, does not by itself indicate that the minor is as mature as an adult. The courts make no separate assessment of maturity. The only other factors besides age that are judge because of the heavy workloads of the juvenile court judges. General trial judges tend to have little knowledge of the needs of minors and their levels of maturity. "Their in-service training tends to be in areas such as criminal procedure and evidence," id. at 229, and their professional memberships rarely include juvenile justice associations, see id. at 229-30.
165 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 166 Indeed, Monty Lee Eddings, one of the 18 juvenile offenders currently on death row, was found to be even less mature than he should have been for his chronological age but was transferred nonetheless. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 107; see also Sherfield v. State, 511 P.2d 598, 601 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) ("The contention that before there can be a proper certification there must be a showing that the juvenile has advanced emotional maturity and a behavioral pattern greater than his chronological age is, in our view, without foundation in the provisions of the Juvenile Act."); cf. Scharf, supra note 133 (study found that the mean moral maturity level of delinquents ages fifteen to seventeen was similar to that of the average ten-to twelve-year-old). 167 A recent study of waiver decisions found that the most important factors in the decision to transfer are the seriousness of the offense, the extent of prior delinquency records, and the results of previous treatment efforts within the juvenile justice system. See BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 211. Moreover, another recent study found that there are rarely any psychological or intellectual differences between those youths for whom the courts grant waiver and those youths for whom the waiver petitions are denied. JUVENILE COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 31, at 187. 168 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 169 One commentator explains:
The basic [difficulty] is [the] assumption that responsibility for the failure of a juvenile to respond to sirvices bespeaks universally of a deficiency on the part of the juvenile. No recognition whatever is given to the fact that in personnel, in facilities and in knowledge we are sadly lacking in our ability to help children change their behavior patterns. To put the problem in terms of the 'imperviousness of individuals' is to obscure this important segment of reality. S. Fox, supra note 129, at 31-32; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. 170 See supra notes 54, 56-57 and accompanying text.
considered are the seriousness of the crime with which the minor is charged and the minor's prior juvenile record.'
71
Further evidence supporting the position that transferred minors are no more mature or able to control their conduct than their peers who remain in the juvenile system is provided by the way society and the criminal courts treat them. For example, transferred minors are still subject to all the laws that society has enacted to protect them from their own immaturity and inability to understand the consequences of their actions. They cannot buy alcohol or cigarettes, they cannot marry without the permission of their parents, and they cannot enter into contracts, except for necessities. 172 Moreover, once convicted of a crime in criminal court, their youth is given great weight by sentencers in determining the appropriate penalty.1 73 In capital punishment states, in particular, youth universally is recognized as mitigating against the imposition of a death sentence. 174 Youth is recognized as a mitigating factor precisely because it is presumed to evidence a lack of maturity and an inability to control conduct and understand the consequences of actions. 175 It thus appears that criminal courts and society in general acknowledge that minors "are not irresponsible children one day and responsible adults the next."' 176 Furthermore, the courts have recognized that the responsibility of society for the minor's crime does not diminish when the minor is in criminal court. The Supreme Court has held that a minor's troubled childhood is a mitigating factor worthy of considerable weight, whereas an adult's troubled youth may be of little importance in determining the appropriate punishment. Thus, the reasons why minors are less responsible than adults hold for transferred juveniles. Even if particular minors are mature and do understand the consequences of their acts, they are still less accountable than adults for their crimes, because society still shares greatly in the responsibility for their criminal acts. Indeed, this is one factor that remains true in regard to all juvenile crime. 178 As the Supreme Court has pointed out, "Not only is it difficult to define, let alone determine maturity, but the fact that a minor may be very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended."' 179
4
The
Responsibility of Minors when Aggravating Factors are Established
For the death penalty to be imposed on an adult or a minor, one or more aggravating circumstances must exist.'
80 Therefore, before it may be concluded that juveniles accused of capital crimes are always less responsible than their adult counterparts, this Comment must examine whether the existence of an aggravating factor increases the responsibility of minors, making them as responsible as adults.
One of the aggravating circumstances commonly found in death penalty statutes is that the killing was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,"' 8 ' meaning that the killing involved torture or some aggravated battery to the victim. 182 That a minor commits a "heinous" murder certainly indicates that he has caused more harm than did the adult who committed a nonheinous killing.1 83 It can never indicate, however, that the minor is as responsible as an adult. That a minor commits a murder in an especially cruel manner does not indicate that the youth is as mature as an adult or that the minor is able to control his conduct or appreciate the consequences of his act. Ct. 3368 (1982) , the death penalty is disproportionate no matter how much harm was caused by the act if the offender was not sufficiently responsible for the harm. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text; see also A. VON HIRscH, supra note 111, at 69 (in determining culpability, "we are not looking exclusively to the act, but also to how much the actor can be held to blame for his act and its consequences") (emphasis in original).
1983]
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS 1503 is in any way less responsible for the minor's crime. Thus, a minor who commits a murder that is heinous, atrocious and cruel is still less responsible for the crime than is an adult who commits a murder that is not. The other aggravating factors found in death penalty statutes tend to be motivated wholly by utilitarian considerations. 184 A finding that the offender poses a future threat to society; 85 that the murder victim was a police officer, judge, or some other government official; 186 or that the murder was committed by a person in, or who had escaped from, the lawful custody of a police officer 87 never can increase the responsibility of a minor, making him as responsible as an adult.
Conclusion Regarding the Disproportionaliy Test
As this examination ofjuvenile responsibility has evidenced, minors are never as responsible as adults, even if they have been transferred and even if aggravating factors have been found. Thus, under the Enmund disproportionality analysis, which focuses on the responsibility of a class of persons rather than on the consequences to the victim and the category of the crime, 8 the death penalty always will be disproportionate punishment for children and adolescents. 189 This does not mean that 184 At least one commentator has suggested that such aggravating factors can never justify the imposition of the death sentence as they have no bearing on culpability and thus in no way indicate that one defendant deserves the death penalty more than another. See Radin, supra note 99, at 1154 n.36; cf. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The inquiry [about the proportionality of the punishment] focuses on whether a person deserves such punishment, not simply on whether punishment would serve a utilitarian goal'). The blanket exclusion of minors from death sentences on the basis of this disproportionality analysis does not contradict those Supreme Court decisions that establish that in death penalty cases there must be individualized consideration of the circumstances of the particular offense and the character of the particular offender to determine whether the particular offender deserves a death sentence. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 110-12; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604-09; see supra note 70 and accompanying text. To exclude all minors from capital sentencing at first glance may appear to contradict this requirement: some minors, for example, may be more responsible than others and thus more deserving of the death penalty. This observation, however, misses the mark. The disproportionality principle operates as a sort of per se rule, making individualized consideration unnecessary. In other words, if the punishment is disproportionate, it will remain disproportionate regardless of the circumstances of the particular offense or the characteristics of the particular defendant. For example, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-600 (1978) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court held that capital punishment is a disproportionate penalty for the crime of rape, because no matter how responsible the particular offender may be and no matter how atrocious the circumstances of a particular rape, death always will be a disproportionate penalty. Seesupra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. Also under Enmund, it is irrelevant that a sentencer may consider the felony murderer's lack of intent and limited participation in the killing in determining whether he or she deserves the death penalty, as the Court has held minors may not be tried in criminal courts or that they may not be punished. What it does mean is that the criminal justice system must recognize the distinct differences between minors and adults and never may treat them as if they are alike by imposing that maximum penalty, death, on minors.' 90 C.
CONTRIBUTION TO ACCEPTABLE GOALS OF PUNISHMENT For a punishment to be constitutional under the excessiveness strand of the eighth amendment, it not only must be proportionate to the offense; it also must make a measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.
19 1 In elaborating on this second requirement, the Supreme Court has said that the punishment in question does not have to serve a goal better than a less severe punishment, but that "the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering. "' 192 Many purposes conceivably are served by capital punishment. that those factors always indicate diminished responsibility and thus that death always would be a disproportionate punishment. See Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3377; see also Note, supra note 109, at 1570-71. It is therefore equally unnecessary for the courts to consider the circumstances of a minor's particular offense or the characteristics of the individual minor, because, as has been shown, minors are in all cases less responsible than adults, and thus never as deserving of the death penalty as the adult offender. Death therefore always will be a disproportionate punishment when imposed on minors. The encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions never could justify the infliction of capital punishment on anyone, minor or adult. In the first place, if the death penalty is used to encourage guilty pleas and thus to deter suspects from exercising their fifth amendment rights to jury trials, it is unconstitutional. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) . (Jackson applies to the states under the criteria articulated in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) .) In the second place, life imprisonment is a severe sanction that can be used as leverage for bargaining for pleas or confessions in exchange for either charges of lesser offenses or recommendations of leniency. Thus, the death penalty is unnecessary for bargaining purposes. A life sentence is an especially useful tool in regard to minors who would face potentially 50 or 60 years in prison. Furthermore, the only possible reason for wanting to encourage guilty pleas and confessions is to save court time and reduce the burdens on the courts. It cannot be to save investigatory time or to prevent the guilty from going free, because no one is likely to be encouraged to confess or plead guilty unless the case against him or her is strong. But if the only purpose is to save the court time and energy, then the death penalty is a particularly inappropriate bargaining instrument. (Harlan, J. , concurring in the result). Also death sentences invariably are appealed, thus increasing the burden on the appellate courts. Therefore, whatever court time may be saved by obtaining confessions or pleading agreements is unlikely to counter the additional time spent by the courts on those cases in which the defendants refuse to plea bargain or confess and are thus tried for capital offenses where the death penalty is sought.
Virtually everyone agrees that capital punishment cannot be defended solely on the basis of any eugenic purpose. (1968) . During the period between conviction and execution, there are a number of collateral attacks on conviction and attempts to obtain executive clemency, all of which exhaust the time, money, and efforts of the state. Minors are particularly likely to seek clemency as they have had much success in the past. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. Continual assertions that the condemned prisoner has gone insane are made. See [Vol. 74 latures: retribution, general deterrence, and specific deterrence. 94 Capital punishment for minors cannot pass eighth amendment scrutiny because it fails to make a "measurable contribution" to any of these goals.
.. Retribution
The question of whether retribution is an appropriate purpose of punishment has been, and continues to be, hotly debated. 195 198 One view toward retribution, not discussed in the text, is that punishment of those who break the law is required to vindicate or restore some transcendant order. See W. BERNS, supra note 196, at 172; E. VAN DEN HAAc, supra note 196, at 11-12. According to this view, punishment of criminals is good in itself, aside from its instrumental effect on the community. This is what Kant's famous pronouncement about the last murderer suggests:
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse themselves around the world), the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment ....
I. KANT The institutional revenge model of retribution justifies punishment as necessary to ensure that citizens will not take the law into their own hands and personally satisfy their desire for vengeance. 20 0 It is very unlikely, however, that members of society will seek personal vengeance if minors do not receive the death penalty for their capital crimes. As minors are less responsible than adults for their crimes, 20 1 there should be less moral outrage toward a juvenile's offense than toward that of an adult. 20 2 But even if there is such moral outrage, the transfer itself and a Another notion of retribution, not discussed in the text, is that criminals owe a debt to the community. Assuming that the criminal had a free choice to break the social compact, punishment evens the score by counterbalancing the unfair gains the criminal secured against others who restrained themselves. See Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIsT 475, 476-79 (1968) . This "debt" approach has been subjected to the criticism that its notion of law abiders restraining themselves because of reliance on others doing likewise makes more sense for traffic offenses and shoplifting than for murder and rape. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 417 (1978) .
A variant of the "debt" view of retribution is one that posits that some extent of the criminal's personal interests are forfeited to the community as payment for the personal interests of which he deprived the victim. However, as Hugo Bedau points out, it is hard to see why the criminal should "pay" the community rather than the victim. See Bedau, supra, at 68.
199 200 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183. The notion that the purpose of retribution is to obviate personal revenge can take two forms: social contract notions or deterrence notions. Under the social contract notion, people in a civilized society agree not to take personal revenge only because the government has been constituted as an agent to do it for the people.
See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1975) . Under the deterrence notion, "governmental revenge is necessary to deter those who commit private acts of violence in the name of revenge." H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 37-38. In both forms, the implicit idea is that the social costs of systematic governmental revenge will be less than the social costs of random private revenge. Seegenerally Radin,supra note 99, at 1169-70. Numerous commentators have argued that such utilitarian notions of retribution never can justify punishment because they fail to take the offender's culpability into account. For example, under this utilitarian rationale, a man whom the authorities knew to be innocent could be punished, if members of the community believed him guilty and threatened to seek personal revenge unless he were punished. See E. VAN who is less responsible for a crime is likely to invoke less moral outrage than the person who is more responsible for a crime); Liebman & Shepard, supra note 70, at 812 (to the sanction short of death should appease it. Adult first-degree murderers usually will receive life sentences or the death penalty, but juvenile murderers could have received rehabilitative dispositions from the juvenile courts. Thus, the very fact that they are tried in criminal courts and eligible for life sentences should soothe the anger of many. Furthermore, the execution of a minor itself will be a source of outrage and protest among some members of the populace, 20 3 thus creating the very problem it was supposed to prevent.
b. The "just deserts" model The other model of retribution used by the Supreme Court in its analysis assumes the necessity of punishment as the "just deserts" for a criminal action. 20 4 "Just deserts" may not be an adequate justification for executing minors, however. Although the Supreme Court has held that this type of retribution is not a "forbidden objective" of punishment, 20 5 its decision was made in the context of adult punishment.
Quite a different conclusion may be reached in the context of punishing minors. Retribution never has been given as a reason for judicial waiver. The justifications offered have been the protection of society, the deterrence of juvenile crime, the alleviation of the juvenile court's massive workload, 20 6 and the inability of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate the offender with the resources currently available in the juvenile system. 20 7 When minors are transferred for these reasons, it does not mean that they are beyond rehabilitation or always will be dangerous. 20 8 It usually means only that the facilities of the juvenile justice system are inadequate or otherwise unsuited to treating their delinquency or dangerous tendencies. 20 9 Because the system cannot serve them, they are passed on to the criminal courts. It is therefore questionable whether the criminal system is justified in punishing these minors ment be proportionate to the culpability of the offender and the offense. 2 18 As juvenile murderers are always less responsible, and thus less culpable, than adult murderers, 2 19 they never will deserve the maximum penalty that may be imposed on adults. 220 
General Deterrence
Those who justify capital punishment on grounds of general deterrence claim that the adoption of this punishment will dissuade people from committing capital crimes.
22 1 There is no agreement as to whether capital punishment accomplishes this result. 222 Even the Supreme
Court has admitted that proof of the death penalty's deterrent effect is "inconclusive. '223 But, "in the absence of more convincing evidence," the Court has held that it would defer to the judgment of those legislatures that maintain that capital punishment is a deterrent to crime. 224 The debate over the deterrent effect of capital punishment, as well as the Supreme Court's decision, however, have focused on the deterrent effect of capital punishment when imposed on adults. There is "more convincing evidence" that the death penalty when imposed on minors is not a deterrent to crime. The execution of minors will not deter the general population from whose character and action they can readily identify. 225 It is therefore extremely doubtful that the execution of minors will deter adults. Moreover, numerous commentators have concluded that when an offender is particularly distinguishable from other members of the population, the failure to punish him or her does not impair the deterrent effect of the threatened punishment on "normal" members of the population. 226 Thus, not only is the execution of minors unlikely to deter adults from committing capital crimes, but failure to execute them will have no effect on the success of capital punishment as a deterrent.
Capital punishment for minors also will fail to deter minors from committing crimes. In the first place, it is doubtful that minors are capable of being deterred. Proponents of the concept of deterrence who have attempted to identify the particular individual most likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment 22 7 have found that in order to respond to deterrence an individual must have the intellectual capacity to understand the threat of punishment and control mechanisms to conform to that understanding. 228 Minors lack both. Children and adolescents tend to live for today, giving little thought to the future consequences of their actions. 229 They are particularly unlikely to understand the legal consequences of their crimes. 230 Moreover, most minors have no fear of death. They simply have not learned to accept its finality and believe that old people die, not teenagers.
23 1 In fact, the threat of capital punishment may make crime more appealing and exciting to youths. Adolescents are in a developmental stage of defiance toward death and danger that produces much risk-taking behavior, 232 and minors often play games of chance with death out of a feeling of omnipotence. 233 That minors commonly flirt with death is evidenced by their propensity toward reckless driving and experimentation with dangerous drugs.
Even if minors understand the threat of punishment and fear death, they have not developed sufficient control over their behavior to conform to that understanding and fear.
2 3 4 Minors, for example, tend to seek the approval of their peers, responding to dangerous dares even when they fear the consequences.
2 35 It is for this reason that most youth crimes are committed in groups. 23 6 Capital punishment for minors very well may give gang leaders the leverage necessary to persuade members to participate in the gang's illegal activities; there may be no more effective way of gaining the cooperation of unwilling adolescents than by calling them "chicken" in front of their peers. noted that specific deterrence may be one of the purposes of capital punishment. 246 The Court did not rely on this justification in finding that the death penalty served acceptable goals of punishment, however, perhaps because incarceration is equally effective in preventing future crimes by the criminals involved. 247 Even if capital punishment makes some necessary contribution to the goal of specific deterrence in regard to adult offenders, it is completely unnecessary in order to prevent juvenile offenders from engaging in future criminal conduct. Just because a minor is found to be "dangerous" or incapable of being rehabilitated by the resources available in the juvenile justice system does not mean that he will not reform as he grows older. As has been noted, "It is impossible to make a judgment that a fourteen-year-old, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his life. ' " 248 In fact, most juvenile crime, including violent crime, abates with age.
2 4 9 Many youths may commit only one serious offense and then cease to be criminally active. 250 Although juveniles who commit repeated violent crimes tend to persist in criminal activity into their twenties, 25 1 their criminal involvement usually reduces gradually and finally ceases shortly thereafter. 252 Indeed, the "possibility of significant character and behavioral changes in young adults ages eighteen to twenty-five is a recognized phenomenon," 253 and the evidence shows that juvenile murderers are low-rate recidivists. 254 
